default.html.twig template not found for page: /resources/legal-not-so-eze/february-2026Appellant is a member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe and operates a tobacco shop on the reservation. The shop is not licensed to sell cannabis but was found to contain approximately 7.5 pounds of cannabis flower. Appellant was charged under Minn. Stat. § 152.0263, subd. 1(1), with first-degree cannabis possession. In Public Law 280, the United States Congress granted Minnesota jurisdiction over criminal matters and civil causes of action in Indian country within the state. It does not, however, grant Minnesota general civil/regulatory authority. If the state law generally permits certain conduct, it is civil/regulatory, but if it generally prohibits certain conduct, it is criminal/prohibitory.
The Court of Appeals notes that in 2023, Minn. Stat. § 342.09, subd. 1(2) and (3), decriminalized possession by adults 21 years of age or older of two pounds or less than of the cannabis flower in their private residence or up to two ounces in public. At the same time, legislation acknowledged tribal governments’ right to regulate the cannabis industry within their jurisdictions. Thus, the court concludes the legislature’s intent with these laws was to generally permit possession of the cannabis flower by adults, subject to regulation, and that Minn. Stat. § 152.0263, subd. 1(1), is civil/regulatory in nature. The State, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to enforce this statute against tribal members for conduct occurring within tribal territorial boundaries. State v. Thompson, A25-0527, 2026 WL 262231 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2026).
Respondent’s driver’s license was revoked after her arrest for driving while impaired. Shortly after a bar closed for the night, police responded to the scene of a reported collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian in the bar’s parking lot. Respondent told officers she was the driver and had consumed three beers that night. Officers did not observe any indicators of impairment, even after conducting an initial horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Respondent declined a request for a PBT, agreeing instead to field sobriety tests. After a second HGN and walk-and-turn test, officers observed indicators of intoxication. A PBT was then administered, which revealed an alcohol intoxication of 0.145. The district court ultimately upheld the revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license, finding police had a reasonable suspicion that Respondent was driving while impaired. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the initial reasonable suspicion of impairment from Respondent’s admission to drinking and the collision was dispelled before Respondent was asked to take a PBT by the combination of Respondent’s satisfactory HGN test and lack of other indicators of impairment.
Under Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1, an officer may request a driver submit to a PBT if the officer has reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. The Supreme Court finds that the totality of the circumstances here provided an objective basis for suspecting Respondent had driven while impaired when officers request the PBT, including: Respondent’s admission to drinking, the timing and location of the incident, and Respondent’s driving conduct. Respondent, however, pointed to other facts that she argues made it unreasonable to suspect impairment, including: no observed physical indicia of impairment, passing the first HGN test, officers’ statements indicating they did not believe she was impaired, an 11-minute lag in officers’ request for a PBT, and the minor nature of the collision which may have been caused by the intoxicated pedestrian. However, the court finds that, while these facts weigh against a finding of reasonable suspicion, they “do not eliminate or overcome the strong inference of impairment supported by other circumstances.”
This strong inference was not dispelled by the time officers requested the PBT. New information obtained by officers “dispels reasonable suspicion only when it conclusively negates the basis for the reasonable suspicion.” None of the information received by officers after Respondent’s admission to drinking and backing into a pedestrian with her car at bar close in the bar parking lot negated the reasonable suspicion established by the initial information. Thus, the district court did not err when it denied Respondent’s petition to rescind her license revocation. Lorsung v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, A24-0540, 30 N.W.3d 777 (Minn. Feb. 4, 2026).
Respondent went to trial on a charge of second-degree refusal to submit to a chemical test under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2. The district court denied Respondent’s request that the jury be instructed that the State was required to prove her actual unwillingness to submit to chemical testing, but the jury was instructed that the State must prove Respondent refused to submit to the test. The jury found Respondent guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), makes it a crime “for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test… of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant…” The district court’s instruction did not define “refuse,” but correctly told the jury the State must prove Respondent refused to submit to the test. The court was not required to define “refuse,” as doing so “would simply replace one common understandable term with another.” The district court did not err in denying Respondent’s request for an “actual unwillingness” instruction. State v. Schmeichel, A23-1905, 30 N.W.3d 791 (Minn. Feb. 4, 2026).
Appellant was convicted of first-degree premediated murder. Part of the investigation included examining Facebook messages sent between Appellant and others. Warrant applications for the searches of the associated Facebook accounts sought all contact information, photos or videos, Neoprints, activity logs, records of communications made or received by the users or between users, and IP logs, but did not provide time or date ranges for the requested records. The records included messages sent by Appellant and received by and stored in Appellant’s accomplices’ Facebook accounts.
The Supreme Court first addresses an issue of first impression: whether a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. Looking to other state and federal courts that have addressed the issue, the court holds that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not retained by the message sender in the digital copy, as the sender cannot control what the recipient does with the message. Thus, the searches of the messages held in Facebook accounts that did not belong to Appellant did not trigger his constitutional protections.
On the other hand, the court does find that the searches of Appellant’s own Facebook accounts violated his right to be free of unreasonable searches, as the warrant authorizing the searches lacked particularity as to subject matter and time. The district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the searches of Appellant’s Facebook accounts and allowing pages from the accounts to be admitted as trial exhibits. However, these errors were harmless, as “the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of these records…” Thus, Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Bonnell, A24-1463, 31 N.W.3d 527 (Minn. Feb. 25, 2026).
Appellant was tried to a jury on a charge of first-degree premeditated murder. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief and at the close of evidence, Appellant made motions for judgment of acquittal, which were denied after the district court applied the direct evidence standard. Appellant was convicted. Appellant argues that, because the evidence against him was circumstantial, the court applied the wrong standard.
Generally, when only circumstantial evidence is presented to prove an offense element, a two-step test is applied to assess the sufficiency of the evidence: (1) determine the circumstances proved, and (2) consider whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Here the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, is that Appellant caused the victim’s death with premeditation and intent.
The Supreme Court clarifies that, even where evidence presented on an offense element is circumstantial, the direct evidence standard is to be applied to a motion for judgment of acquittal made and decided before the jury’s verdict. This approach is necessary, given the logical impossibility of applying a circumstantial evidence test, which requires resolving questions of fact in favor of the verdict, before a verdict is rendered, and the time constraints on deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal.
Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Firkus, A23-0973, 2026 WL 517248 (Minn. Feb. 25, 2026).